Archive for 八月, 2006

为什么会有黎以冲突?

星期日, 八月 13th, 2006

TARAS案:全细他娘的猜想

7月12日,是黎以冲突的开端。当日,黎巴嫩真主党越境袭击以色列国防军,端了以色列人的炮楼,掠走了俘虏。这一事件是黎以冲突的开端。但是依然有很多不清不楚的事情。

其一,早在2003年,真主党与以色列之间也发生过类似的袭击绑架事件,但是并没有引发黎以大规模的冲突。为什么此次绑架会引起如此旷日持久的冲突?

一种解释是,哈马斯与以色列的冲突为黎以冲突作了铺垫。7月上旬,以色列国内最大的焦点问题是哈马斯成员在加沙地带越境袭击,绑走以色列的士兵,随即引起以色列的强烈反应。从该事件看,奥尔默特似乎必须作出强硬反应。因为,越境成功袭击,如果不能避免则意味着单边撤离计划完全落空。单边撤离计划的本质是,跟巴勒斯坦划清界限。无论巴勒斯坦那边是建国还是内乱,都在巴勒斯坦内部进行,与以色列无争执。

而从以色列国内政治而言,奥尔默特领导的前进党,其核心纲领就是继续沙龙的单边撤离计划。而国内包括内塔尼亚胡等反对派已经开始指责执政党的政策失败。在这种情况下,奥尔默特的选择并不多,他必须让哈马斯尝到苦头,认识到进行越境袭击将带来巨大的惩罚。否则,约旦河西岸的单边撤离将成泡影。

在这种情形下,以色列内部形成了为了“拯救大兵瑞恩”所以要发动战争的观点。而此时真主党发动了同样的袭击,那么如果以色列政府采取不同的原则处理哈马斯人质问题和真主党人质问题,显然会遇到很大的舆论压力。

此外,如果这种事情不惩罚,那么绑架模式会被反以势力认为是有效的,成功的,从而进行推广。

第三,黎巴嫩真主党方面似乎是有意要将火烧旺,把以色列拖入战争。在7月13日,真主党开始大规模向以色列北部地区发射火箭和导弹。这比绑架人质对以色列的威胁要大得多。因为它首先意味着北部2百万左右的以色列人随时都有可能遇到袭击的危机,惶惶不可终日。而在不久的未来,黎巴嫩可能会拥有大批更长射程的,可以袭击以色列全境的导弹,那将是以色列的噩梦。

所以,基于以上的推理,以军是没有选择地被拖入了战争。

 

以上的问题存在一个前提,既黎巴嫩真主党是有目的地挑起战火,这里首先要确定,黎巴嫩真主党越境袭击以色列国防军究竟是一次偶然的突发事件,还是真主党高层下令进行的有意识的袭击活动,如果是后者,它的战略目的是什么?

这个问题,恐怕只有纳斯鲁拉自己出来说话才能解释清楚。而从推理看,姑且假设黎巴嫩真主党是故意挑起战火的(如前文所述,掠夺战俘的时间和用导弹、火箭攻击以色列北部地区)。一种解释是,黎巴嫩真主党与伊朗关系密切。领袖来自伊朗,是霍梅尼的信徒,党众都是什叶派穆斯林,经济上、武器上得到伊朗的援助。而7月初,伊朗正在受到联合国的压力。欧盟要求伊朗在7月15日前放弃核浓缩,而黎以冲突在7月12日开始。

这一假说看上去最有说服力,因为仅从黎巴嫩真主党的行动而言,它的做法不会让交战中的任何人受益。恐怕战争没有打响以前,纳斯鲁拉就清楚,自己一时消灭不了以色列,而以色列也消灭不了真主党(这一问题留到后面说。)。所以,打这场仗对真主党没有什么好处。

伊朗挑起战火的好处有二,首先是黎以问题将成为焦点,伊朗受到的国际社会压力会减轻。不过这一说法依然不足,因为黎以战火燃起,未必会导致国际社会的话题转移,暂时撇开伊朗。事实上,欧盟继续向伊朗,并没有妥协。伊朗核谈判首席代表拉里贾尼表示要将期限延长到8月22日(伊朗教历当月的结束日),也遭到拒绝。

第二,伊朗借此显示了它在中东地区的影响力。事实上,7月28日法国外长抵达黎巴嫩首都贝鲁特后也公开表示,中东问题的解决离不开伊朗。

此外,还有几点可以作为伊朗和真主党关系密切的佐证。一是,战争打响,伊朗和叙利亚随即签订攻守同盟,共同在舆论上声援真主党。而在7月底,以军袭击了叙利亚、黎巴嫩边境的公路。据说他们发现有来自伊朗的物资和士兵从叙利亚进入黎巴嫩。

而更为明显地是,8月3日,叙利亚、伊朗、真主党分别在不同地区同时呼吁停火,这种共进退的姿态,也明确表示了他们之间的密切联系。

 

而如果真主党和伊朗的攻守同盟大致成立的话,那么这场战争的意义和价值也可以敲定了。相信大约过不了几年,研究中东问题的学者会这样来描述现在的黎以冲突:2006年夏天发生在地中海东岸的以色列与黎巴嫩真主党之间的战争是大中东地区格局变化的标志性事件。它同时标志着泛阿拉伯民族主义的反以斗争走向结尾,伊斯兰宗教势力,尤其是什叶派势力反以活动的兴起。

因为,伊朗支持真主党、美国支持以色列,战争就不是真主党和以色列之间的仇恨和矛盾,而是美国和伊朗在整个中东的地位争夺。这意味着,即使以色列完全撤出黎巴嫩、释放巴勒斯坦和黎巴嫩真主党的人,划定黎以边界,也难以实现长久和平。

以色列和真主党不过是小卒子。美国和伊朗的争斗,恐怕才刚刚开始。事实上,伊朗是地头蛇,在2亿什叶派穆斯林,尤其是伊拉克什叶派中有着领袖地位的号召力,控制着波斯湾的霍尔姆斯海峡,还拥有中国和俄罗斯技术的导弹,同时将有能力制造原子弹。

这绝对是美国不好对付的角色。

伊朗与西方势力直接接触,可以作为黎以冲突意义从地区冲突变为大中东地区博弈开台的一个标志。从时间表说,这天应当是7月31日。多年以后,学者会发现2006年7月31日显得突兀。这一天,法国外交部长与伊朗外长在黎巴嫩首都会面。而这是伊朗-叙利亚-真主党-哈马斯联盟(这些学者也许会给这个联盟起个更简洁的名字,或者直接用他们名称的所写ISHH同盟)的代表与西方大国的代表发生了冲突爆发以来的首次会面。

而,随即,在8月1日英国首相布莱尔在美国作的讲话,阐释战争的意义。(10天后,英国破获了试图制造恐怖袭击的穆斯林原教旨主义团伙。)8月2日,德国前外长访问德黑兰拜访哈塔米、现外长给叙利亚外长打电话,8月3日西班牙外长访问大马士革作为对7月31日重大意义的佐证。

这些接触是双方的第一轮谈判。最让人好奇地是,7月31日,法伊外长究竟谈了什么,对于8月3日伊朗盟军方面的同时呼吁停火以及8月5日突然出现的法美停战联合决议有没有关系?

可惜这些问题只有当事人日后写回忆录时才能明了了。

 

黎以冲突中各方的帐如何算

星期六, 八月 12th, 2006

(请勿转载)

我从哈马斯游击队端以色列炮楼开始,盯着以色列周边冲突已经一个多月了。我本人是穆斯林信仰,在黎巴嫩也住过1年多,可是新闻看久了,我反倒越来越同情以色列。

依据我的理解,以色列并没有太多选择。如果沙龙还在,恐怕他也没的选择。谁上台都一样,不论国际社会舆论压力多大,只要美国硬挺着,以色列就会打。

从人道主义讲,任何战争都要谴责。可是站在历史的立场上,地球人离达到联合国宪章所提出的理想标准还差得远。武器贸易还是这个世界上最活跃的贸易之一。那么对于奥尔默特和佩雷茨这样的政治家而言,死人不死人不是他们要考虑的关键性因素。他们要考虑的是,如果不打仗了,那么危险有没有其他途径解决,未来是不是可以让以色列获得安全。

而目前,以色列面临的最大问题是明摆着的。如果此次不能彻底清掉黎巴嫩真主党摧毁的导弹,那么以色列北部三分之一的地区的上百万人将长期作防御导弹的战备状态。而更为糟糕地是,如果不能割断真主党和叙利亚、伊朗的关系,很快,真主党将会拥有大量可以覆盖以色列全境的导弹,那将是以色列的噩梦。到时候,以色列的处境更被动,而仗依然要打。晚打不如早打。这是战争,以色列和以往一样,无路可退。所以,平民死了,联合国观察员死了,仗还得继续打。

美国人虽然在8月5日和从一开始就要求停战的法国人合作了一个停战协定草案,但是我总觉得这里头有猫腻。依据布什、赖斯和英国首相布莱尔的讲话材料,美国人不希望在“战况没有变化”的情况下停战。美国人署名的这份草案,依据他们自己的说法,是其未来谈判的一个基准。也就意味着,它仅仅可以作为美国人在中东问题游戏规则的第一次正式表态。通过了,美国人定的游戏规则成为未来谈判基准,用联合国安理会的牌子,至少可以吓唬吓唬人。通不过,正好,以色列继续打,把真主党干掉。

当然,美国人算的帐跟以色列人算法是不一样的。美国人算的是大帐。除了黎以问题,它要算巴勒斯坦问题、伊拉克的什叶派、海湾的石油安全、阿富汗的政局以及非传统安全。

现在,伊拉克什叶派领袖人物萨德尔号召在巴格达搞反以色列、反美的百万人大游行,大马士革的街头在前、现任总统父子之外,又挂上了真主党领袖纳斯鲁拉的头像。而据伊朗的媒体说,土耳其首都安哥拉也在闹游行。

以色列打下去,什叶派民怨沸腾,阿拉伯人民怨沸腾。民怨沸腾,恐怖袭击的潜在危险性就要加大,非传统安全问题就要让好多好多国家花钱。尤其是美国、英国和其他欧洲国家。而且,纽约期货市场的石油期货就要继续涨价,尽管全球的石油供求关系还相当稳定。油价上涨,美国的大跨国公司当然会挣钱,可是其他行业链会受到打击。更何况,石油上涨对伊朗也有好处。

是的,伊朗,美国人在中东地区的对手不是真主党这种游击队,甚至也不是躲在山里不出来的本·拉登,而是伊朗——唯一一个由什叶派穆斯林建立的政教合一的真主之共和国。

所以,今天的这场黎以冲突已经跟以往的第一到第五次中东战争完全不同了。那时候是以色列和周边的阿拉伯国家闹纠纷,而美国和苏联两个超级大国是在纠纷中看到好处介入。可是今天,以色列跟这些逊尼派的阿拉伯国家,和阿拉伯民族主义者已经能坐下来谈判了。一些根本性的,核心矛盾已经得到妥协了。

在中东,真正想把以色列从地图上抹去的,只有狂热的伊斯兰教原教旨主义者和这些原教旨主义者的核心——伊朗的极端保守派。他们口口声声说以色列是犹太复国主义者的国家。这在一定程度上是有道理的。1883年来巴勒斯坦的东欧犹太人是复国主义者。在西欧跟英国政府作交易,号称巴勒斯坦压根荒无人烟,所以应该把“没有人民的土地还给没有土地的人民”的是犹太复国主义者。还有30年代搞恐怖袭击的,48年建国的时候把巴勒斯坦人赶跑,搞大屠杀的,那都是犹太复国主义者干过的。正因为如此,这些原教旨主义者才不相信西方人的“公正”。他们要的,是霍梅尼所谓的“主的公正”。

问题是,如何才算主的公正?如果犹太复国主义者需要被清算,那么近代史上其他搞种族灭绝、侵略和仇杀的国家是不是要清算?包括曾经是伊斯兰世界的中心土耳其人对亚美尼亚人的种族清洗是不是也要清算?

好,即便要清算,目前以色列建国58年,男女老少有600万人口。把以色列抹去是不是要把这600万人一起抹去?都赶到欧洲去?这就是主的公正么?这符合经过两次世界大战总结出来的联合国宪章的精神么?

当然,犹太复国主义原教旨主义者在今天也依然存在。他们根据圣书传说和当地有犹太人居住的历史就要确立这个国家的合法性,这不成逻辑。在这一点,我的立场是,历史本身是人类发生问题的历史。最重要的,不是要清算,因为清算本身也会产生新的问题。清算也无法使历史被抹去。原教旨主义的清算,只能产生对应的原教旨。而比复仇更高贵的,是追求美好的生活。

可是,现在中东地区的现实是,萨达姆被推翻给了什叶派翻身的机会,他们将像当年在阿拔斯王朝时期作的一样,利用各派矛盾,重新执掌巴格达。而伊朗则在这个势力中崛起,依靠其在中东各地区建立的代理和同盟与想要推动中东地区民主化运动的西方国家作斗争。在英国首相布莱尔看来,这场战争有点像冷战,是一场意识形态之争,是“民主、自由”与“主的公正”的争斗。

这意味着,即使以色列把俘虏、囚犯都放了,把占领的土地都还了。战争还会继续。因为根本的对峙在伊朗和美国。

事实上,黎以冲突是当前中东格局演变中重要一环。其成败与否可能会影响到两股势力的平衡。搞定黎巴嫩真主党,才有可能搞定伊拉克的什叶派。相反地,伊拉克反美的什叶派就会嚣张,伊拉克会成为伊朗的联合分部。而同时,叙利亚可以继续对黎巴嫩进行遥控,和以色列讨价还价。

如果以色列持续进攻,最终胜了,真主党被解除了武装,黎巴嫩政府能够摆脱叙利亚的影响,独立地控制黎巴嫩全境。那么等于伊朗在以色列周边失去了一个重要的代理人和合作伙伴,同时也失去了从黎巴嫩的海岸线向加沙地带走私军火的战略要地。当然,伊朗可以重新扶植新的势力,问题是那需要时间和新的投资。

而即使真主党被瓦解,纳斯鲁拉如果没被以色列特种部队逮住,则很有可能会被保住。法国总统希拉克跟他关系不错,可以替他说情,在黎巴嫩境内,他依然是什叶派势力声望最高的政治人物之一。尤其如果以色列达到基本战略目标后,在各方压力和博弈结果后,可能会选择撤出黎巴嫩,划定舍贝农场等边界线,甚至,交换一些俘虏和囚犯。那么,纳斯鲁拉会成为民族英雄。

而黎巴嫩政府则有机会控制全境,摆脱叙利亚的控制。这并非不可能,因为在国际社会的压力下,去年叙利亚已经从黎巴嫩撤军。当然,他们很可能留给真主党一笔丰厚的财产。

相反,如果以色列不能在两、三个星期内获得胜利,那么以色列和美国的麻烦就会很大。平民伤亡所引发的国际舆论压力、什叶派原教旨主义分子的仇恨、以及战事对国际油价带来的影响,中东逊尼派阿拉伯国家也许会越来越倾向真主党。同时,10月份以后,黎巴嫩、以色列将进入雨季。到时候整天整夜的倾缸大雨,电闪雷鸣,对于双方的军事行动都会很不利。那么伊朗、叙利亚、哈马斯、真主党联盟则完全可以见好就收,呼吁停火,保持实力。

而到时候,国际部队派不派,其实没多少意义。因为战事可能会自然平息,而以色列还会获得的损失是,将极有可能无法实现约旦河西岸的加沙地带。外加作战不利,奥尔默特的地位将不保,更不幸地是,他可能会成为以色列历史上一个倒霉蛋一样的角色。

问题是,这种可能性不是没有。就算以色列国防军能够找到,并摧毁真主党库存的导弹和喀秋莎火箭,但是很难灭掉真主党。因为黎巴嫩的地形非常适合游击队生存。黎巴嫩全境被两道南北向平行的黎巴嫩山脉包围。山脉坡度很高,山川内有河流纵横,山顶有常年不化的积雪。山内有当地人开垦的梯田。这里自古以来就是各个时期的“异教徒”避难之所。真主党在山里经营数十年,在山里与以色列打游击战。所以以色列绝对不可能在黎巴嫩实现六日之战的传奇,找到被俘士兵的几率也非常小。

这也是战事进行了1个月,纳斯鲁拉依然能在电视台挥洒自如地演讲原因所在。

当然作如此预测的是,目前看不出叙利亚和伊朗直接参战的任何迹象。一旦开战,则叙利亚-伊朗同盟可能受到打击,尤其是以现在的以色列与叙利亚军事对比,在没有任何战略目的的时候,这样做很可能属于找死。

中国劳工在以色列

星期五, 八月 11th, 2006

秦轩
/
夏晨

 

719
夜里,程鸿从特拉维夫坐车回了海法。

712
黎以开战以来,海法地区始终是黎巴嫩真主党袭击的重要目标。就在程鸿回来的前一天,真主党向包括海法地区在内的以色列北部城镇发生了若干枚导弹和喀秋莎火箭。

但是程鸿还是决定回来。“我放心不下工地上的工程。”程鸿跟他在特拉维夫的同事说。随后他去车站花24谢克尔(相当于40元人民币)买了回海法的票。公司仓库的钥匙有一个备份在他手中,仓库管理员生并不能来。而他的老板也希望他回来管理工程并且告诉他“这边很安全”。

程鸿是在以色列的2万多中国劳工的一名。20028,程鸿和天津国际劳务输出公司签订了合同,花了近七万人民币,取得了北京园林建筑工程公司赴以色列斯东人力公司的商务考查签证。打那以后他一直在以色列务工。

“那天晚上大街上空无一人。”后来程鸿对记者说。

 

黎以冲突中的中国劳工

712
,黎巴嫩真主党袭击以色列的边防哨所,引发黎以冲突。第二天上午9点左右,程鸿听到了袭击警报。不一会儿,程鸿和同伴在工地六楼的防弹房里看见三颗火箭落入远处海法港口的海里。“水柱很高”程鸿说。接着,他还看到两颗火箭在海港的围栏爆炸。他还看到,在袭击警报拉响的半个小时以内,各国货物的集装箱全都转移了。

这天下午,程鸿也决定转移。他坐公交车去了特拉维夫。

.两天后,公司开始组织还没有撤到特拉维夫的职工撤离海法。程鸿回忆说,7
17
日和18日两天。海法没有中国劳工。

20日白天,程鸿现在所在的中国土木工程集团公司陆续有4个中国劳工从特拉维夫回到海法。他们是续程鸿以后最早回到海法的中国劳工。当天晚上又有3个回来。这天回来的都是今年春节前刚刚过来的。他们一听说海法这边还安全,就急忙赶回来打工。据介绍,他们为了来以色列打工,向国内的牵线公司支付了十几万的费用。

不过,战争并没有引起工人工资上涨。尽管黎巴嫩人在和以色列人干仗。海法的工地上,中国工人每天依旧工作10小时,可以拿到42美元的工钱。

程鸿说,到87
,海法的中国劳工大约有二十几名。中土公司的13个劳工,有6个在大理石加工工厂,以及4个中土公司的职员。而以色列大使馆的新闻官员估计,在海法的中国劳工数量可能会更多,如果也同时算上没有合法身份的中国劳工的话。

中土劳工给这些工人做了安排。大约10人左右的工人不住在海法,每天早晚班车接送,往返于海法的工地与特拉维夫的北大站营区。交通和住宿都不用花钱。北大站营区能够居住1000,隶属于以色列的绍莱伯莱公司,是当地的一所大型建筑公司。他们会雇用一些罗马尼亚和中国人在北大站营区打扫卫生,经营食堂。

而剩下在海法留守的中国劳工则住在紫罗门营区。这里,每个营区上都会有两间防弹房。工地旁住宿楼里每户也都配有一间防弹房。“工地几百米外就是以色列的导弹发射架,看到它我就觉得安全了。”程鸿说。

每天程鸿都可以听到三四次空袭警报。时间一般在中午12点,下午3点。下午5点到六点半有时候也会有空袭警报。86日晚上七点
左右,程鸿一下听到2次空袭警报。这一天,黎巴嫩真主党的一枚火箭弹打死10名以色列人。据以色列媒体称,这枚火箭弹直接打到了人群里。不过,程鸿也表示晚上睡觉期间都很安全。

从黎以开仗起,程鸿每天要和家里通三次电话,报平安。家里人看到电视报纸上关于黎以冲突报道,就会问他情况,而他总会跟她们说这里很安全。

事实上,战争没有改变程鸿留在以色列打工的决心。他从24岁那年就出国打工,在俄罗斯、新加坡各打过不到三年的工,可是他在以色列已经干了5年多了。“在以色列打工的待遇最好。”程鸿说。他的女儿已经在念大专,媳妇在乡办厂做工。程鸿是家里的经济支柱。

 

在以色列工作的中国劳工很受欢迎

“在以色列中国工人的勤奋很出名。”以色列大使馆新闻官艾思卡说。他表示在以色列中国工人很受欢迎。据以色列《国土报》的报道,
2005
年中国向以色列输出约1900名劳务,占其当前引进合法劳务的6%05年共有2.9万名合法外籍工人进入以色列,2.4万名离以。目前以色列劳务市场合法外籍工人9.8万,非法的约有8万。

艾思卡介绍,据估计,将在以色列合法和非法打工的中国工人算上,总数在2万左右,不会超过25千人。另据长期在以色列生活的中国人曹新女士介绍,在以色列的中国劳工大约合法身份的有1万多,还有一万左右是非法身份的。曹新曾是一位专门为以色列中国劳工服务的《北京-特拉维夫》杂志工作的记者。

事实上,在2002年以前,以色列中国劳工数量最高达到10万人。但是2005年五月,沙龙政府对外籍劳工进行了清理活动。艾思卡表示那次清理是针对全体外籍劳工的,原因是在以色列工作的外籍员工数量过多,达到了以色列总人口的10%。

据他介绍,中国劳工赴以色列的基本流程是,以色列公司根据需要向中国的人力资源中介进行申请。由中方人力资源公司招聘劳工。然后这些劳工的名单会拿到以色列有关部门审批。如果发现这名劳工在以色列有非法打工的记录,那么他将会被拒签。名单经过审批后会给大使馆,大使馆则与中国公司联系经过确认,为这些劳工办理签证。不过,艾思卡也许并不知道,中国劳工在应聘时往往都向中介公司交了巨额的费用。

艾思卡介绍,在以色列的中国劳工主要从事建筑业。

而根据81
《耶路撒冷邮报》介绍,
以财政部长
Abraham Hirchson

在海法召开的经济内阁会议上宣布将向北部的主管部门划拨1亿谢克尔重建经费,并在黎以冲突结束后立即成立北部重建小组。这笔款项不包括以前已分配给北部当地政府的5000万谢克尔。这一战后重建计划将可能为中国劳工提供大量的工作机会。

 

非法劳工处境悲惨

像程鸿那样的合法劳工还可以受到保护,但是在以色列还存在很多因签证过期或者从埃及或巴勒斯坦偷渡过去的非法中国劳工。但是在以色列打工的待遇相对优厚,很多人为此忍辱偷生。一位定居在以色列的范雨臣教授在他的新书《生活在约旦河西岸》中记录了很多的故事,其中还讲到一个因走投无路成为巴勒斯坦人雇佣军的非法劳工。据范教授介绍,2000年巴勒斯坦人民起义期间,他在一个犹太人定居点外面发现,一群和以色列士兵对峙的巴勒斯坦人中有一个穿懒汉鞋的中国人。后来这名中国人腿部中弹,又被以军投掷的催泪弹熏晕了。范教授将他抢救过来才知道。那人是陕北的农民,在家里借钱凑了4万块钱给一家中介公司。那家公司骗他说到以色列可以获得很高的工资待遇。但是来以色列三个月后,他被辞退,失业。后来他遇到一个巴勒斯坦人,雇佣他去向以色列扔石块,每天可以挣600谢克尔,如果扔燃烧弹可以加150谢克尔。他遇到范教授时,已经扔了三天的石头。

“后来他执意去找雇他扔石头的人要钱,就再也没有跟我联系过。”范教授说。

像这种劳工在以色列还有。2年前,在加沙地带埃及以色列边境处还发生过偷渡的中国劳工被枪击身亡的故事。

此外,中国的一些中介公司也在做手脚。据曹新介绍,在以色列,一些中国的中介公司常常会五六千美元买一个工作指标,再转手卖给中国劳工。以色列人因此会向政府写申请,比如家里的老人需要照顾,家务活没人做,以此来获得雇用外籍劳工的指标。而实际的情况却是,他们并不一定需要雇用劳工。中国劳工拿到的有可能是假签证,问题其实出在中介公司给安排别的雇主,而不是护照上的合法雇主。一旦被以色列当局发现,则这名劳工的打工将是非法的。

 

黎以冲突,联合国须尽快介入

星期二, 八月 8th, 2006

TARAS案:观点瞎攒的,不能太当真。不过,好久没写评论了,上来练练手,呵呵。

8月5日,美法两国突然向联合国安理会递交一项针对黎以冲突的停战决议草案。这是黎以冲突以来,第一份由国际社会提出的重要决议草案。但是这项草案出师不利。8月6日,安理会成员国的代表就该草案进行讨论,没能就草案通过与否达成共识,而同时,黎巴嫩政府、黎巴嫩真主党以色列和伊朗均对此草案表示不赞同。换句话说,这是一份冲突双方都不认可的草案。

问题是,黎以冲突的实际情况是,即使黎以双方不认同该草案,国际社会在就黎以冲突的问题解决中也应当以英法决议草案为讨论基础。因为黎以冲突,已经超越黎以双方所能控制的范围之内,一发而动全身。这场冲突的解决已经涉及到大中东地区的安全、和平乃至影响未来世界石油安全等更为深刻的议题。

事实上,黎巴嫩政府对该草案进行批驳并不妥当,因为没有国际社会的帮助,黎巴嫩政府不会比现在更好过。

即使是2000年以色列从黎巴嫩撤出以后,黎巴嫩依然是个分裂的国家。真主党一方面在南部靠近蓝线地区实行自治,一方面在国会渗透势力。而叙利亚则陈兵黎巴嫩,直到2005年国际社会压力下才从贝卡谷地撤军。相反地,尽管黎巴嫩政府指责该草案偏向以色列。但是根据该草案,黎巴嫩政府自身将逐渐实现比过去更多的权力。

而根据草案,黎巴嫩政府将获得如下好处:首先,黎巴嫩政府将有可能在维和部队的帮助下控制全境。实现其自2000年以色列撤军以来都未能实现的目标。其次,它将和以色列划清边界,签订和平协议,收复造成两国冲突隐患的地区,尤其是草案中强调的舍贝农场。第三,真主党与国外势力的联系将被割断,黎巴嫩将可能成为一个真正意义上的独立政府,而不是“代理人战争”的牺牲品。但是,在目前的局势下,迫于国内反以色列的压力,以及来自真主党和叙利亚的压力,黎巴嫩政府选择了反对美法草案的态度,不惜和其有密切关系的法国唱对台戏。这种行为并不能让其真正获得最大的利益。

而对于以色列来说,一味以捍卫国家安全作为入侵黎巴嫩的理由,完全不顾及其在中东地区可能引起的仇恨。以色列的入侵不仅仅已经造成黎巴嫩国内对真主党支持率的骤增,同时也正在引起穆斯林世界,尤其是什叶派穆斯林的仇恨。这些天,在伊拉克、叙利亚或者土耳其乃至印度尼西亚都发生了反以色列和反美的游行活动。尤其以什叶派穆斯林最为活跃。这意味着战争继续下去,本来保持基本中立态度的阿拉伯逊尼派国家都将被民意裹胁,不得不和真主党、伊朗站在一起。事实上,8月4日,黎巴嫩真主党领袖纳斯鲁拉已经在电视讲话中表明,如果阿拉伯世界的领袖不站在真主党一边,将无法面对人民。

而真主党和伊朗、叙利亚对草案的反应则才是真正合理的。因为随着战局的扩大,伊朗和什叶派势力正在取代逊尼派和阿拉伯民族主义势力成为决定中东格局的核心力量。所以,即使他们真想求和,也是为了保住实力,求得暂时的妥协,而绝非长期的和平。

在这种情况下,如果完全平衡黎以双方的要求愿望,整个中东格局将可能变得更糟。即使以色列消灭的真主党,也会有新的极端的宗教原教旨主义势力上台。以军的行动只能增加仇恨,使以色列陷入清剿与复仇的非理性冲突轮回中,没有任何一方能够获得利益。

更为糟糕地是,以军的行动一旦使战争规模扩大,叙利亚、伊朗等国被迫拖下水,则对于中东乃至全世界都将酝酿更大的灾难。

所以,联合国实际上面对的已经不是真主党和以色列的冲突,而是一场关于大中东新格局的国际冲突。冲突的一方为以在核问题、在对以色列态度问题上与联合国矛盾的伊朗为首的势力,包括叙利亚、黎巴嫩真主党和哈马斯。

为了避免更为长期危险的冲突爆发。国际社会必须立刻介入,一方面迫使以色列作出让步,另一方面保障黎巴嫩政府能够掌握全境且独立于其他国家。而美法两国提出的这份草案真实价值在于,它象征着国际社会干预中东问题的一个起点和部分原则。即使此次联合国不能通过该草案,也应当尽快拟定其他决议,并尽快采取行动,避免中东局面的进一步恶化。

新停火草案与中东格局的布局开始

星期二, 八月 8th, 2006

 

黎以冲突性质的改变发生在731
。该日,法国外长与伊朗外长在贝鲁特会面。这是黎以冲突以来,伊朗国家领导层与西方国家领导人的首次会面。此会面直接开启了对峙双方背后势力的一系列运作,而更为深刻地是,它使冲突的核心问题真正从黎巴嫩真主党与以色列的较量上升为伊朗、叙利亚核心与美英等国在中东大棋盘上的直接博弈。

随后几日,双方的交涉频繁。82
,德国前外长出访德黑兰,会见已经被边缘化的伊朗改革派领袖哈塔米。同日,德国现外长与叙利亚外长通电话。83
,叙利亚总统巴沙尔在大马士革隆重会见西班牙外长。

几番交涉之后,伊朗、叙利亚、黎巴嫩真主党同盟率先出招。83
,艾哈迈迪内贾德在吉隆坡、巴沙尔在大马士革、真主党领袖纳斯鲁拉则在黎巴嫩北部分别呼吁停火。美法两国很快作出反应。2天后,二者公布联合停火决议草案,递交联合国。

这份草案是黎以冲突以来,首次发表的系统解决黎以冲突问题的决议草案。但是却遭到各方的批评,除去安理会成员未能就草案通过与否达成共识外,黎以双方均要求对草案进行修改。

真主党的反应更为强烈,草案公布次日,真主党开始向以色列发动冲突以来最大规模的导弹火箭袭击。

事实上,这份决议草案的核心内容,并非像评论界所认为的,过于偏袒以色列,没有要求以色列撤军等等。若依据草案内容,真主党将很有可能获得两项利益:其一,以色列将可能释放囚犯。其二,以色列将把舍贝农场归还黎巴嫩,从而使真主党像2000年以军撤离时期一样再次获得抵抗侵略的民族英雄的形象与政治支持。真主党夺取人质所提出的要求几乎完全得到满足。

但是,真主党和伊朗、叙利亚联盟无法接受该草案。因为该草案将割断伊朗、叙利亚与黎巴嫩真主党的联系,消除黎以之间的边界纠纷,维持和平。而黎巴嫩真主党与黎巴嫩政府立场的根本区别在于,前者要求消灭以色列,而后者则要求与以色列划清边界,维持和平。一旦完成后者,敌人消失,抵抗运动也将失去存在的价值和意义。真主党将很难在黎巴嫩获得存在的土壤。而哈马斯与法塔赫的区别也在于此。

所以,一旦草案通过,真主党虽然可以获得政治资本,转为黎巴嫩国内政治势力中什叶派力量的支持者,却再也无法成为伊朗在中东战局中的棋子。因此无法为伊朗和目前的真主党领袖接受。

没有这枚棋子,伊朗则一时难以在中东地区实现其战略目标。

而伊朗、真主党的战略目标,与其说是消灭以色列,不如说是在国际冲突中实现什叶派在中东地区的崛起,而作为什叶派的领袖,伊朗将在崛起中成为中东世界的核心力量。事实上,随着战事的继续,什叶派穆斯林的反以情绪已经点燃。在从黎巴嫩、叙利亚、土耳其、伊拉克和伊朗的新月形地带上,沿途的什叶派势力已经开始发动反以游行。就在8月初,巴格达地区的大街上高喊反美反以色列口号的什叶派随处可见。

 

事实上,美英等国已经认识到一场新的中东对峙已经开局。81
,英国首相布莱尔发表历史性演讲,指出这场对峙将是一场长期的战争,其关键在于意识形态之争而非地区利益得失,这等于承认所谓与从德黑兰到贝鲁特一线什叶派势力对峙已经成为现实。

布莱尔认识到,黎以冲突的解决,已经不仅仅是围绕巴以问题,巴勒斯坦如何维持和平的问题,而是将影响到伊拉克、伊朗核问题、反恐、能源安全等关键问题。

因此这是一场地头蛇与外来强龙的博弈,鹿死谁手,无人可知。

布莱尔是个有为青年

星期一, 八月 7th, 2006

Text: UK PM Tony Blair’s
historic LA speech defining war on
"Reactionary Islam" 

 Speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs
Council by UK PM Tony Blair
1 August 2006

www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page9948.asp

[IMRA: PM Blair’s otherwise brilliant
presentation does reveal cognitive
dissonance:
"Israel…a country surrounded by a lot of
people who basically want to deny
your right to exist"

but

" The Palestinian State must …not
threaten Israel’s safety. This is what
the majority of …Palestinians want. " ]
================
Full text:

Overnight, the news came through that as
well as continuing conflict in the
Lebanon, Britain’s Armed Forces suffered
losses in Iraq and Afghanistan. It
brings home yet again the extraordinary
courage and commitment of our armed
forces who risk their lives and in some
cases tragically lose them,
defending our country’s security and that of
the wider world. These are
people of whom we should be very proud.

I know the US has suffered heavy losses
too in Iraq and in Afghanistan. We
should never forget how much we owe these
people, how great their bravery,
and their sacrifice.

I planned the basis of this speech
several weeks ago. The crisis in the
Lebanon has not changed its thesis. It has
brought it into sharp relief.

The purpose of the provocation that began
the conflict was clear. It was to
create chaos, division and bloodshed, to
provoke retaliation by Israel that
would lead to Arab and Muslim opinion being
inflamed, not against those who
started the aggression but against those who
responded to it.

It is still possible even now to come out
of this crisis with a better
long-term prospect for the cause of
moderation in the Middle East
succeeding. But it would be absurd not to
face up to the immediate damage to
that cause which has been done.
We will continue to do all we can to halt
the hostilities. But once that has
happened, we must commit ourselves to a
complete renaissance of our strategy
to defeat those that threaten us. There is
an arc of extremism now
stretching across the Middle East and
touching, with increasing definition,
countries far outside that region. To defeat
it will need an alliance of
moderation, that paints a different future
in which Muslim, Jew and
Christian; Arab and Western; wealthy and
developing nations can make
progress in peace and harmony with each
other. My argument to you today is
this: we will not win the battle against
this global extremism unless we win
it at the level of values as much as force,
unless we show we are
even-handed, fair and just in our
application of those values to the world.

The point is this. This is war, but of a
completely unconventional kind.

9/11 in the US, 7/7 in the UK, 11/3 in
Madrid, the countless terrorist
attacks in countries as disparate as
Indonesia or Algeria, what is now
happening in Afghanistan and in Indonesia,
the continuing conflict in
Lebanon and Palestine, it is all part of the
same thing. What are the values
that govern the future of the world? Are
they those of tolerance, freedom,
respect for difference and diversity or
those of reaction, division and
hatred? My point is that this war can’t be
won in a conventional way. It can
only be won by showing that our values are
stronger, better and more just,
more fair than the alternative. Doing this,
however, requires us to change
dramatically the focus of our policy.

Unless we re-appraise our strategy,
unless we revitalise the broader global
agenda on poverty, climate change, trade,
and in respect of the Middle East,
bend every sinew of our will to making peace
between Israel and Palestine,
we will not win. And this is a battle we
must win.

What is happening today out in the Middle
East, in Afghanistan and beyond is
an elemental struggle about the values that
will shape our future.

It is in part a struggle between what I
will call Reactionary Islam and
Moderate, Mainstream Islam. But its
implications go far wider. We are
fighting a war, but not just against
terrorism but about how the world
should govern itself in the early 21st
century, about global values.

The root causes of the current crisis are
supremely indicative of this. Ever
since September 11th, the US has embarked on
a policy of intervention in
order to protect its and our future
security. Hence Afghanistan. Hence Iraq.
Hence the broader Middle East initiative in
support of moves towards
democracy in the Arab world.

The point about these interventions,
however, military and otherwise, is
that they were not just about changing
regimes but changing the values
systems governing the nations concerned. The
banner was not actually "regime
change" it was "values change".

What we have done therefore in
intervening in this way, is far more
momentous than possibly we appreciated at
the time.
Of course the fanatics, attached to a
completely wrong and reactionary view
of Islam, had been engaging in terrorism for
years before September 11th. In
Chechnya, in India and Pakistan, in Algeria,
in many other Muslim countries,
atrocities were occurring. But we did not
feel the impact directly. So we
were not bending our eye or our will to it
as we should have. We had barely
heard of the Taleban. We rather inclined to
the view that where there was
terrorism, perhaps it was partly the fault
of the governments of the
countries concerned.

We were in error. In fact, these acts of
terrorism were not isolated
incidents. They were part of a growing
movement. A
movement that believed Muslims had departed
from their proper faith, were
being taken over by Western culture, were
being governed treacherously by
Muslims complicit in this take-over, whereas
the true way to recover not
just the true faith, but Muslim confidence
and self esteem, was to take on
the West and all its works.

Sometimes political strategy comes
deliberatively, sometimes by instinct.
For this movement, it was probably by
instinct. It has an ideology, a
world-view, it has deep convictions and the
determination of the fanatic. It
resembles in many ways early revolutionary
Communism. It doesn’t always need
structures and command centres or even
explicit communication. It knows what
it thinks.

Its strategy in the late 1990s became
clear. If they were merely fighting
with Islam, they ran the risk that fellow
Muslims - being as decent and
fair-minded as anyone else - would choose to
reject their fanaticism. A
battle about Islam was just Muslim versus
Muslim. They realised they had to
create a completely different battle in
Muslim minds: Muslim versus Western.

This is what September 11th did. Still
now, I am amazed at how many people
will say, in effect, there is increased
terrorism today because we invaded
Afghanistan and Iraq. They seem to forget
entirely that September 11th
predated either. The West didn’t attack this
movement. We were attacked.
Until then we had largely ignored it.

The reason I say our response was even
more momentous than it seemed at the
time, is this. We could have chosen security
as the battleground. But we didn’t. We chose
values. We said we didn’t want
another Taleban or a different Saddam.
Rightly, in my view, we realised that
you can’t defeat a fanatical ideology just
by imprisoning or killing its
leaders; you have to defeat its ideas.

There is a host of analysis written about
mistakes made in Iraq or
Afghanistan, much of it with hindsight but
some of it with justification.
But it all misses one vital point. The
moment we decided not to change
regime but to change the value system, we
made both Iraq and Afghanistan
into existential battles for Reactionary
Islam. We posed a threat not to
their activities simply: but to their
values, to the roots of their
existence.

We committed ourselves to supporting
Moderate, Mainstream Islam. In almost
pristine form, the battles in Iraq or
Afghanistan became battles between the
majority of Muslims in either country who
wanted democracy and the minority
who realise that this rings the death-knell
of their ideology.

What is more, in doing this, we widened
the definition of Reactionary Islam.
It is not just Al-Qaeda who felt threatened
by the prospect of two brutal
dictatorships - one secular, one religious -
becoming tolerant democracies.
Any other country who could see that change
in those countries might result
in change in theirs, immediately also felt
under threat. Syria and Iran, for
example. No matter that previously, in what
was effectively another
political age, many of those under threat
hated each other.

Suddenly new alliances became formed
under the impulsion of the common
threat.

So in Iraq, Syria allowed Al-Qaeda
operatives to cross the border. Iran has
supported extremist Shia there. The purpose
of the terrorism in Iraq is
absolutely simple: carnage, causing
sectarian hatred, leading to civil war.

However, there was one cause which, the
world over, unites Islam, one issue
that even the most westernised Muslims find
unjust and, perhaps worse,
humiliating: Palestine. Here a moderate
leadership was squeezed between its
own inability to control the radical
elements and the political stagnation
of the peace process. When Prime Minister
Sharon took the brave step of
disengagement from Gaza, it could have been
and should have been the
opportunity to re-start the process. But the
squeeze was too great and as
ever because these processes never stay
still, instead of moving forward, it
fell back. Hamas won the election. Even
then, had moderate elements in Hamas
been able to show progress, the situation
might have been saved. But they
couldn’t.

So the opportunity passed to Reactionary
Islam and they seized it: first in
Gaza, then in Lebanon. They knew what would
happen. Their terrorism would
provoke massive retaliation by Israel.
Within days, the world would forget
the original provocation and be shocked by
the retaliation. They want to
trap the Moderates between support for
America and an Arab street furious at
what they see nightly on their television.
This is what has happened.

For them, what is vital is that the
struggle is defined in their terms:
Islam versus the West; that instead of
Muslims seeing this as about
democracy versus dictatorship, they see only
the bombs and the brutality of
war, and sent from Israel.

In this way, they hope that the arc of
extremism that now stretches across
the region, will sweep away the fledgling
but faltering steps Modern Islam
wants to take into the future.

To turn all of this around requires us
first to perceive the nature of the
struggle we are fighting and secondly to
have a realistic strategy to win
it. At present we are challenged on both
fronts.

As to the first, it is almost incredible
to me that so much of Western
opinion appears to buy the idea that the
emergence of this global terrorism
is somehow our fault. For a start, it is
indeed global. No-one who ever half
bothers to look at the spread and range of
activity related to this
terrorism can fail to see its presence in
virtually every major nation in
the world. It is directed at the United
States and its allies, of course.
But it is also directed at nations who could
not conceivably be said to be
allies of the West. It is also rubbish to
suggest that it is the product of
poverty. It is true it will use the cause of
poverty. But its fanatics are
hardly the champions of economic
development. It is based on religious
extremism. That is the fact. And not any
religious extremism; but a
specifically Muslim version.

What it is doing in Iraq and Afghanistan
is not about those countries’
liberation from US occupation. It is
actually the only reason for the
continuing presence of our troops. And it is
they not us who are doing the
slaughter of the innocent and doing it
deliberately.

Its purpose is explicitly to prevent
those countries becoming democracies
and not "Western style" democracies, any
sort of democracy. It is to prevent
Palestine living side by side with Israel;
not to fight for the coming into
being of a Palestinian State, but for the
going out of being, of an Israeli
State. It is not wanting Muslim countries to
modernise but to retreat into
governance by a semi-feudal religious
oligarchy.

Yet despite all of this, which I consider
virtually obvious, we look at the
bloodshed in Iraq and say that’s a reason
for leaving; we listen to the
propaganda that tells us its all because of
our suppression of Muslims and
have parts of our opinion seriously
believing that if we only got out of
Iraq and Afghanistan, it would all stop.

And most contemporaneously, and in some
ways most perniciously, a very large
and, I fear, growing part of our opinion
looks at Israel, and thinks we pay
too great a price for supporting it and
sympathises with Muslim opinion that
condemns it. Absent from so much of the
coverage, is any understanding of
the Israeli predicament.

I, and any halfway sentient human being,
regards the loss of civilian life
in Lebanon as unacceptable, grieves for that
nation, is sickened by its
plight and wants the war to stop now. But
just for a moment, put yourself in
Israel’s place. It has a crisis in Gaza,
sparked by the kidnap of a solider
by Hamas. Suddenly, without warning,
Hizbollah who have been continuing to
operate in Southern Lebanon for two years in
defiance of UN Resolution 1559,
cross the UN blue line, kill eight Israeli
soldiers and kidnap two more.
They then fire rockets indiscriminately at
the civilian population in
Northern Israel.

Hizbollah gets their weapons from Iran.
Iran are now also financing militant
elements in Hamas. Iran’s President has
called for Israel to be "wiped off
the map". And he’s trying to acquire a
nuclear weapon. Just to complete the
picture, Israel’s main neighbour along its
eastern flank is Syria who
support Hizbollah and house the hardline
leaders of Hamas.

It’s not exactly a situation conducive to
a feeling of security is it?

But the central point is this. In the
end, even the issue of Israel is just
part of the same, wider struggle for the
soul of the region.

If we recognised this struggle for what
it truly is, we would be at least
along the first steps of the path to winning
it. But a vast part of the
Western opinion is not remotely near this
yet.

Whatever the outward manifestation at any
one time - in Lebanon, in Gaza, in
Iraq and add to that in Afghanistan, in
Kashmir, in a host of other nations
including now some in Africa - it is a
global fight about global values; it
is about modernisation, within Islam and
outside of it; it is about whether
our value system can be shown to be
sufficiently robust, true, principled
and appealing that it beats theirs. Islamist
extremism’s whole strategy is
based on a presumed sense of grievance that
can motivate people to divide
against each other. Our answer has to be a
set of values strong enough to
unite people with each other.

This is not just about security or
military tactics. It is about hearts and
minds about inspiring people, persuading
them, showing them what our values
at their best stand for.

Just to state it in these terms, is to
underline how much we have to do.
Convincing our own opinion of the nature of
the battle is hard enough. But
we then have to empower Moderate, Mainstream
Islam to defeat Reactionary
Islam. And because so much focus is now,
world-wide on this issue, it is
becoming itself a kind of surrogate for all
the other issues the rest of the
world has with the West. In other words,
fail on this and across the range,
everything gets harder.

Why are we not yet succeeding? Because we
are not being bold enough,
consistent enough, thorough enough, in
fighting for the values we believe
in.

We start this battle with some
self-evident challenges. Iraq’s political

process has worked in an extraordinary way.
But the continued sectarian
bloodshed is appalling: and threatens its
progress deeply. In Afghanistan,
the Taleban are making a determined effort
to return and using the drugs
trade a front. Years of anti-Israeli and
therefore anti-American teaching
and propaganda has left the Arab street
often wildly divorced from the
practical politics of their governments.
Iran and, to a lesser extent, Syria
are a constant source of de-stabilisation
and reaction. The purpose of
terrorism - whether in Iran, Afghanistan,
Lebanon or Palestine is never just
the terrorist act itself. It is to use the
act to trigger a chain reaction,
to expunge any willingness to negotiate or
compromise. Unfortunately it
frequently works, as we know from our own
experience in Northern Ireland,
though thankfully the huge progress made in
the last decade there, shows
that it can also be overcome.

So, short-term, we can’t say we are
winning. But, there are many reasons for
long-term optimism. Across the Middle East,
there is a process of
modernisation as well as reaction. It is
unnoticed but it is there: in the
UAE; in Bahrain; in Kuwait; in Qatar. In
Egypt, there is debate about the
speed of change but not about its direction.
In Libya and Algeria, there is
both greater stability and a gradual but
significant opening up.

Most of all, there is one
incontrovertible truth that should give us
hope.
In Iraq, in Afghanistan, and of course in
the Lebanon, any time that people
are permitted a chance to embrace democracy,
they do so. The lie - that
democracy, the rule of law, human rights are
Western concepts, alien to
Islam - has been exposed. In countries as
disparate as Turkey and Indonesia,
there is an emerging strength in Moderate
Islam that should greatly
encourage us.

So the struggle is finely poised. The
question is: how do we empower the
moderates to defeat the extremists?

First, naturally, we should support,
nurture, build strong alliances with
all those in the Middle East who are on the
modernising path.

Secondly, we need, as President Bush said
on Friday, to re-energise the MEPP
between Israel and Palestine; and we need to
do it in a dramatic and
profound manner.

I want to explain why I think this issue
is so utterly fundamental to all we
are trying to do. I know it can be very
irritating for Israel to be told
that this issue is of cardinal importance,
as if it is on their shoulders
that the weight of the troubles of the
region should always fall. I know
also their fear that in our anxiety for
wider reasons to secure a
settlement, we sacrifice the vital interests
of Israel.

Let me make it clear. I would never put
Israel’s security at risk.

Instead I want, what we all now
acknowledge we need: a two state solution.

The Palestinian State must be independent,
viable but also democratic and
not threaten Israel’s safety.

This is what the majority of Israelis and
Palestinians want.

Its significance for the broader issue of
the Middle East and for the battle
within Islam, is this. The real impact of a
settlement is more than
correcting the plight of the Palestinians.
It is that such a settlement
would be the living, tangible, visible proof
that the region and therefore
the world can accommodate different faiths
and cultures, even those who have
been in vehement opposition to each other.
It is, in other words, the total
and complete rejection of the case of
Reactionary Islam. It destroys not
just their most effective rallying call, it
fatally undermines their basic
ideology.

And, for sure, it empowers Moderate,
Mainstream Islam enormously. They are
able to point to progress as demonstration
that their allies, ie us, are
even-handed not selective, do care about
justice for Muslims as much as
Christians or Jews.

But, and it is a big ‘but’, this progress
will not happen unless we change
radically our degree of focus, effort and
engagement, especially with the
Palestinian side. In this the active
leadership of the US is essential but
so also is the participation of Europe, of
Russia and of the UN. We need
relentlessly, vigorously, to put a viable
Palestinian Government on its
feet, to offer a vision of how the Roadmap
to final status negotiation can
happen and then pursue it, week in, week
out, ’til its done. Nothing else
will do. Nothing else is more important to
the success of our foreign
policy.

Third, we need to see Iraq through its
crisis and out to the place its
people want: a non-sectarian, democratic
state. The Iraqi and Afghan fight
for democracy is our fight. Same values.
Same enemy. Victory for them is
victory for us all.

Fourth, we need to make clear to Syria
and Iran that there is a choice: come
in to the international community and play
by the same rules as the rest of
us; or be confronted. Their support of
terrorism, their deliberate export of
instability, their desire to see wrecked the
democratic prospect in Iraq, is
utterly unjustifiable, dangerous and wrong.
If they keep raising the stakes,
they will find they have miscalculated.

From the above it is clear that from now
on, we need a whole strategy for
the Middle East. If we are faced with an arc
of extremism, we need a
corresponding arc of moderation and
reconciliation. Each part is linked.
Progress between Israel and Palestine
affects Iraq. Progress in Iraq affects
democracy in the region. Progress for
Moderate, Mainstream Islam anywhere
puts Reactionary Islam on the defensive
everywhere. But none of it happens
unless in each individual part the necessary
energy and commitment is
displayed not fitfully, but continuously.

I said at the outset that the result of
this struggle had effects wider than
the region itself. Plainly that applies to
our own security. This Global
Islamist terrorism began in the Middle East.
Sort the Middle East and it
will inexorably decline. The read-across,
for example, from the region to
the Muslim communities in Europe is almost
instant.

But there is a less obvious sense in
which the outcome determines the
success of our wider world-view. For me, a
victory for the moderates means
an Islam that is open: open to
globalisation, open to working with others
of
different faiths, open to alliances with
other nations.

In this way, this struggle is in fact
part of a far wider debate.

Though Left and Right still matter in
politics, the increasing divide today
is between open and closed. Is the answer to
globalisation, protectionism or
free trade?

Is the answer to the pressure of mass
migration, managed immigration or
closed borders?

Is the answer to global security threats,
isolationism or engagement?

Those are very big questions for US and
for Europe.

Without hesitation, I am on the open side
of the argument. The way for us to
handle the challenge of globalisation, is to
compete better, more
intelligently, more flexibly. We have to
give our people confidence we can
compete. See competition as a threat and we
are already on the way to
losing.

Immigration is the toughest issue in
Europe right now and you know something
of it here in California. People get scared
of it for understandable
reasons. It needs to be controlled. There
have to be rules. Many of the
Conventions dealing with it post WWII are
out of date. All that is true.
But, properly managed, immigrants give a
country dynamism, drive, new ideas
as well as new blood.

And as for isolationism, that is a
perennial risk in the US and EU policy.
My point here is very simple: global
terrorism means we can’t opt-out even
if we wanted to. The world is
inter-dependent. To be engaged is only
modern
realpolitik.

But we only win people to these positions
if our policy is not just about
interests but about values, not just about
what is necessary but about what
is right.

Which brings me to my final reflection
about US policy. My advice is: always
be in the lead, always at the forefront,
always engaged in building
alliances, in reaching out, in showing that
whereas unilateral action can
never be ruled out, it is not the
preference.

How we get a sensible, balanced but
effective framework to tackle climate
change after the Kyoto Protocol expires in
2012 should be an American
priority.

America wants a low-carbon economy; it is
investing heavily in clean
technology; it needs China and India to grow
substantially. The world is
ready for a new start here. Lead it.

The same is true for the WTO talks, now
precariously in the balance; or for
Africa, whose poverty is shameful.

If we are championing the cause of
development in Africa, it is right in
itself but it is also sending the message of
moral purpose, that reinforces
our value system as credible in all other
aspects of policy.

It serves one other objective. There is a
risk that the world, after the
Cold War, goes back to a global policy based
on spheres of influence. Think
ahead. Think China, within 20 or 30 years,
surely the world’s other
super-power. Think Russia and its precious
energy reserves. Think India. I
believe all of these great emerging powers
want a benign relationship with
the West. But I also believe that the
stronger and more appealing our
world-view is, the more it is seen as based
not just on power but on
justice, the easier it will be for us to
shape the future in which Europe
and the US will no longer, economically or
politically, be transcendant.
Long before then, we want Moderate,
Mainstream Islam to triumph over
Reactionary Islam.
That is why I say this struggle is one about
values. Our values are worth
struggling for. They represent humanity’s
progress throughout the ages and
at each point we have had to fight for them
and defend them. As a new age
beckons, it is time to fight for them again.

Read the Q and A

Question:

Mr Prime Minister, can Britain take the
lead in speaking to Iran and Syria
directly?

Prime Minister:

You know the thing that always surprises
me about this is that people talk
about this issue of engagement with Iran and
Syria as if there was some
doubt about what we were saying, or where we
stood, or maybe the message
hadn’t been clear enough.
Actually the message is absolutely clear,
the message is if you stop
supporting terrorism, if you stop trying to
acquire nuclear weapons and
breach your international obligations then
we are willing to have a
partnership with you, but if you export
terrorism around the region and
destabilise democracy in Iraq, we will
confront you. Now I know there are
all sorts of people who engage, and of
course we do, we send messages the
whole time to both governments, but I am
afraid I have come to the
conclusion that this is not an issue of
communication, it is not that people
can’t read our handwriting, it is actually
that they lack the will to do
what they need to do and we need to make
sure they have that will.

Question:

What is the United Nations capable of,
and what is it not? Can all it do is
pass meaningless resolutions?

Prime Minister:

Actually I would say to you that I think
the United Nations can, in certain
circumstances, be absolutely essential to
solving the world’s problems, and
there are situations that have arisen in
which the United Nations has come
together and made a real difference, and
indeed some of the things that we
were talking about earlier in relation to
some of the disputes in Africa and
so on indicate that very, very clearly too.
But there are two things that
need to happen. The first is that we need to
reform the institutions of the
United Nations thoroughly because they are
not as they should be; and the
second thing is you can make any amount of
institutional change, but the key
thing is whether there is the right
political alliance at the heart of the
Security Council of the United Nations.

Now I think there is a case incidentally
for broadening the Security Council
and I favour that, but in a way whatever
institutional framework you have,
the basic point is we have to have political
agreement between the leading
powers. And that is why I say in particular
I think the transatlantic
alliance is really, really important. Europe
and America, whatever their
differences from time to time, they have the
values system in common and
they should be proud of their alliance and
we should make sure that we use
that as a basis for trying to engineer the
right type of political alliance
within the UN Security Council.

So look, if the UN didn’t exist we would
be inventing it, that is for sure,
at least some people would, but I think it
could be so much more effective
but it needs reform, it needs leadership and
it needs the right political
alliance to motivate it.

Question:
In what ways does our passion for western
democracy get in the way of
resolving global or regional conflicts?

Prime Minister:

Well that is a very interesting question
and a very good question. You see I
have come to the conclusion, and I really
confess to you I have changed my
view of this, that actually there are no
stable relationships in the long
term unless there is progress towards
democracy and freedom, that in other
words the idea that countries that are
governed by either secular or
religious dictatorships provide a solid
basis for progress, I think is just
wrong. And the interesting thing about Iraq
and Afghanistan, and this was
the fascinating thing, is that so many
people told us that you just don’t
understand it, people in Iraq aren’t
interested in democracy. The turnout in
Iraq, despite people being threatened and in
some cases killed on the way to
the polls, was higher than the last
Presidential election or the last
general election in Britain. So people do
care about this and democracies by
and large don’t fight each other. So I
actually think in the end, yes, short
term sometimes the passion for democracy can
be difficult because there are
so many vested interests that don’t want it.
Long term I have come to the
conclusion that actually it is only through
the spread of liberty, and
democracy, and the rule of law and basic
respect for human rights that we
will get peace and security.

Question:

Should NATO be used in Lebanon, as it is
in Afghanistan and Bosnia?

Prime Minister:

I think it depends on what is most
helpful for the situation there, because
we will need both the support of the
government of Israel and the government
of Lebanon for the force to operate. And I
think at this point in time it is
not possible to be clear about it, although
I would say to you that the
majority of people probably would say that
NATO shouldn’t be involved. But
whatever force is involved it has to have
the capacity of making sure that
the original reason for the conflict, which
were the activities in breach of
the United Nations resolutions down in the
south of Lebanon by Hezbollah are
curtailed, because unless the government of
Lebanon is given proper
authority over the whole of Lebanon this
will erupt again. And in my view
the purpose of any multi-national force has
got to be able to provide a
bridge between the position for the
government of Lebanon now, and the
position we need to get to, which is not a
permanent multinational force on
the ground, but is a Lebanese democracy that
is capable of having its writ
run in every single part of the country
without armed militias taking over
parts of the country and running them in the
way that they want.

And that is why in Lebanon what is
important is to support Lebanese
democracy. They have done amazing things in
that country, it is why it is so
tragic what has been brought about, but the
only way, whether it is NATO or
anybody else, we are going to get an
effective multinational force there is
if it has at its heart one principle, which
is that our purpose is to make
sure that when the Lebanese people vote in
their government in a democracy,
they do so without outside interference from
Syria or anyone else, and
without inside interference by well armed
militia.

Question:
To many Americans there seems to be a latent
and growing anti-Semitism in
Europe. How can this be stopped?

Prime Minister:

I think that there are really two parts
to this. I think there are people
who are anti-Semitic in Europe and there has
been a growing rise of
anti-Semitic attacks which are appalling and
terrible in different parts of
Europe. But I think there is another strain
of opinion, and this is the
reason I devoted some of my speech to doing
this, that just doesn’t see it
from Israel’s point of view at all, I mean
just doesn’t understand what it
is like to be a country surrounded by a lot
of people who basically want to
deny your right to exist, and in a way I
think that is part of the problem.
And I also think it then gets run in with
the issue to do with
anti-Americanism because of America’s
support for Israel. And again I said
this in a speech I made a couple of months
ago, the only way you ever
confront this is confronting the basic
ideas.

What I said in that speech, let me try
and explain this, a lot of what
happens in the western debate, in the
European debate very specifically, but
also in other countries too, less so in
America but still in parts I guess
in the American system, is that everybody
abhors the terrorist method,
people don’t get up and support terrorism
but they kind of buy half way into
some of the ideas that they are putting
forward in the sense that they say
yes well you do have a real sense of
grievance against America and its
allies, but you shouldn’t blow people up in
pursuit of it. And my point the
whole way through is we are never going to
defeat this until we say actually
that is wrong, you have no sense of
grievance.

In Afghanistan and Iraq we have billions
of dollars waiting there to help
reconstruct the country, the country is a
democracy, where is the
suppression? You know the Taliban down in
the south where British troops
have gone in to try and clear out the
Taliban, they have literally taken
teachers out in front of their class and
executed them in front of class for
teaching girls. Now where should the sense
of grievance be - against us who
have actually helped those countries and
those people get democracy for the
first time, or these absolutely brutal
murderous terrorists who want to send
them back into some sort of feudal time?

In other words unless we are prepared to
stand up and say, ‘No actually what
you think about America is nonsense’, I mean
I said this to some people the
other day and it was difficult, but you have
got to say it. I said look, as
far as I am aware people in America are free
to practise their religion as
Muslims, and they certainly are in Britain,
what is the sense of grievance?

Now we may disagree about this or that
aspect of foreign policy, but that is
not the same as saying that our purpose in
going to Iraq and Afghanistan was
something to do with the fact that those
countries were Muslim, it was to do
with the fact that they were threatening our
security. That is where this is
difficult.

So the answer to your question is yes,
there are real worries about
anti-Semitism, but I think that the problem
is slightly different from that,
if I am frank about it, it is that there is
a world view there that is very,
very, well I would call it somewhat soggy
and unable just to see the
realities of what is happening. And that is
what you have to confront, not
just the activities of the terrorists, but
their ideas, because far too many
of their ideas have some purchase on opinion
in the western world.

【纵横·伊朗】伊朗改革派发力有些迟

星期日, 八月 6th, 2006

伊朗改革派势力作出与政府完全不和谐的行动与态度。这表明伊朗政坛内部反对派的势力依然有存在和行动的空间。问题是,在目前的背景下,改革派将很难有能力影响艾哈迈迪内贾德政府的有关政策。

本周初,在伊朗外来压力最大的时刻,改革派开始发力。一是哈塔米时期的前伊朗最高国家安全理事会秘书长兼首席核武器谈判代表哈森- 哈尼发表重要文章,反对当下的伊斯兰扩张运动。这实际上等于改革派公开自己的政治纲领。

二是82
,德国前外长约施卡·菲舍尔抵达德黑兰,与哈塔米会面,而没有见到艾哈迈迪内贾德。这是改革派从行动上表现自己和政府不一。

改革派的做法,证明在伊朗政界,依然存在合理的因素,保证改革派声音可以在两大极端保守势力拉夫桑贾尼派和亚兹迪派的夹击下采取独立行动。问题是,85
以后,改革派已经失去政府施压的时间和可能性。因为,美法两国已经初步同意停火,伊朗政府最困难的时刻已经过去。

随着7月底法国外交部长与伊朗外交部长在黎巴嫩会面,83
,伊朗、叙利亚、黎巴嫩真主党同时且分别宣布支持停火。而85
,美法两国联合宣布提出解决黎以冲突的草案,也支持各方全面停火。这意味着角力双方已经互探到对方底线,并很快达成一致。事实上,双方高层恐怕都不知道战争将向何处发展。伊方在核问题上并没有占到便宜,但已经成功挑起什叶派穆斯林世界反以色列和美国的敌对情绪。尽管真主党和以色列的命运还无法决定。但是美法的联合草案已经为伊朗和西方世界的谈判政策提供了一个起点。

伊朗政府已经可以从美法两国的初步妥协中获取“政治正确”,从而获取伊朗民众和什叶派穆斯林世界的支持。此时改革派继续出手,将有被视为叛徒的危险,同时也无法改变美法的对伊政策的基本方针,所以,改革派并没有多少机会。

一些黎巴嫩人的博客链接

星期六, 八月 5th, 2006


http://bedouina.typepad.com/doves_eye/



http://www.beirutbeltway.com/beirutbeltway/


http://jamalghosn.blogspot.com/


http://lebop.blogspot.com/


http://siegeoflebanon.blogspot.com/


http://beirutspring.blogspot.com/


http://lebanesebloggers.blogspot.com/


http://urshalim.blogspot.com/


http://welcometomydream.blogspot.com/


http://beirutnotes.blogspot.com/


http://beirutupdate.blogspot.com/


http://meastpolitics.wordpress.com/


http://ibosblog.blogspot.com/